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Abstract 
 
This paper takes Alexis de Tocqueville’s concern with the emotional life of citizens as 
a cue for exploring the role of collective memory within ‘the self-organizing sphere’ 
and asking how the invocation of memory affects progress towards democracy. The 
paper hones in on the Brazilian experience, re-assessing Brazil’s amnesiac past as 
well as its much lauded ‘turn to memory’. Against common assertions that Brazil’s 
‘turn to memory’ will enhance the country’s democratic credentials, this paper argues 
that the move from an ‘absent’ to a ‘present’ past in Brazil in fact bodes rather mixed 
prospects for the country’s democratic deepening. 
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Introduction 
 
During Brazil’s period of military rule  (1964-1985), social struggles were heavily 
repressed. Thousands of alleged dissidents were imprisoned and/or harassed by 
police, many were exiled and hundreds were illegally executed. Brazil’s military 
period was characterised by extra-constitutional decrees, arbitrary implementation of 
the rule of law and high levels of police violence. Despite harrowing tales of torture, 
intimidation and oppression of oppositional voices, establishing a ‘culture of memory’ 
relating to Brazil’s dictatorship years has been a slow and rather uncertain process. 
Whilst neighboring Argentina established its National Commission on the 
Disappearance of Persons shortly after the collapse of the military regime in 1983 
and Chile created the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation immediately 
after the return to civilian rule in 1990, successive Brazilian governments avoided 
taking measures to come to terms with the country’s authoritarian past. Since 2005 
however,  there  has  been  a  notable  turnaround  in  official  state  discourse.  The 
Federal  Government,  under  the  leadership  of  the  Partido  dos  Trabalhadores 
(Workers Party or PT), has actively promoted a new culture of memory around the 
dictatorship years. It has argued that the new memory politics is an ‘epilogue to the 
democratic   transition’   (Amorim   2011),   hastening   Brazil’s   progress   towards 
democratic consolidation. But is this really the case? What does the existing wisdom 
tell us and how is this borne out in the Brazilian example? This paper aims to tackle 
these questions and more. 
 
Despite a raft of scholarship from the liberal tradition suggesting that a strong civil 
society presence facilitates progress towards democratic deepening, to date there 
has been little extensive discussion of collective memory as one of the factors linking 
associational forms to political outcomes. In order to address this gap, the paper first 
revisits and connects scholarly works from the traditions of civil society and social 
memory studies. By weaving together the fragments of existing wisdom from these 
two traditions, the paper not only disrupts dominant Neo-Tocquevillean accounts that 
largely neglect the ideational, emotional and normative substance of civil society, it 
also proffers that when actors within civil society are pressed to remember, the 
consequences for democracy may be quite varied. With this in mind, the paper then 
moves on to explore and apply pressure to claims that Brazil’s ‘turn to memory’ will 
enhance the country’s democratic credentials. It concludes that the shift from an 
‘absent’ to a ‘present’ past in Brazil in fact holds rather uncertain prospects for 
democratic deepening. 
 
On civic association and democratic deepening: Tocqueville revisited 
 
In recent decades there has been a surge of academic interest in the broad range of 
social institutions and associational forms that operate outside the confines of the 
state. Drawing on the works of Alexis de Tocqueville and Antonio Gramsci amongst 
others, academics from both liberal and critical traditions have attributed value to the 
existence of a ‘self-organising sphere’. In both traditions, civil society is assumed to 
constitute  a  crucial  check  on  governmental  power.  Scholars  drawing  on  the 
Gramscian tradition have underlined how civil society operates as the site of 
bourgeois dominance and counter-hegemonic struggle (Kumar 1993; Cox 1999; 
Anheier  et  al.  2001).  However,  the  liberal  view  which  elevates  the  relationship 
between dense associational forms and ‘democratic deepening’ has been far more 
3  
influential among political officials and institutions, informing policy prescriptions from 
national and international centres of power. For this reason, the paper deals 
exclusively with civil society discourses in the liberal tradition, and in particular the 
work of the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville’s travelogues from 
his journey to the United States drew links between the interactions that occur within 
private associations and democratic stability. Although Tocqueville probably 
overstated the exceptionality of the American system and its democratic credentials, 
his insights were nonetheless valuable. His early 19th Century observations of 
American political culture led him believe that forms of voluntary association and 
sociable interaction amongst men [sic] were what could prevent democratic societies 
from descending into a chaos born of egoism, greed and disorder of the human soul. 
 
In fact, in Tocqueville’s personal letters, he showed a great concern for the emotional 
substance of political and social life, claiming that ‘states were not defined by their 
laws, but rather from their origins by the feelings, thought processes, ideas, hearts 
and minds of their inhabitants’ (letter dated 26 October 1853, cited by Hoffman 
 
2006).  Moreover,  in  some  correspondence  he  appears  to  lament  the  growing 
primacy of scientific reason, suggesting that, ‘[w]hat one meets with least frequently 
in these days are true and lasting passions, influencing and directing the whole 
life….Doubt and philanthropy make us shrink from all action, whether for the purpose 
of effecting great good or great evil; and we are always languidly engaged in the 
pursuit of trifles, none of which really attract, repel us, or fix us’ (de Tocqueville: letter 
to M. J. J. Ampère, dated 1841). 
 
 
In the twentieth century, Robert Putnam brought Tocquevillean ideas back into the 
fold with his claim that, ‘democracy is strengthened, not weakened, when it faces a 
vigorous  civil  society’  (Putnam  1993:182)  and  that  Civil  Society  Organizations 
(CSO’s)  could  play  a  major  role  in  building  citizenship  skills.  Putnam’s  liberal 
contemporaries concurred: 
 
…an abundant stock of social capital is presumably what 
produces a dense civil society, which in turn has been almost 
universally seen as a necessary condition for modern liberal 
democracy... If such a political system is not to degenerate into 
anarchy, the society that subsists in that protected sphere must 
be capable of organising itself (Fukuyama 2001:7). 
 
In the post Cold War context, neo-Tocquevillean ideas became particularly influential 
as political theorists and policymakers sought out models to democratize states 
‘brought in from the cold’. Today, references to civil society have become an almost 
obligatory insert for policy discussions and reports relating to development and 
democracy promotion. The World Bank (2014) claims for instance that,  ‘[it] has 
learned through these three decades of interaction that the participation of [CSO’s] in 
government development projects and programs can enhance their operational 
performance by contributing local knowledge, providing technical expertise, and 
leveraging social capital.  Further, CSOs can bring innovative ideas and solutions, as 
well as participatory approaches, to solving local problems’. In turn, USAID (2014) 
argues  that  a  vibrant  civil  society  is  a  necessary  requirement for  a  democratic 
political culture. 
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However, the overriding emphasis in neo-Tocquevillean liberalism is on the presence 
and density of associations rather than the substance of them. Putnam’s ‘Bowling 
Alone’ for example, uses membership of choral societies, football clubs and other 
associations as a proxy for an organized reciprocity that is in turn treated as a 
precondition for socioeconomic modernisation  and  democracy.  He  bemoans  the 
decline  in  associational  memberships,  suggesting  that  Americans  ought  to  ‘do 
something’  to  stall  the  resulting  ‘democratic  disarray’  (Putnam  1995).  ‘High  on 
America's agenda should be the question of how to reverse these adverse trends in 
social  connectedness,  thus  restoring  civic  engagement  and  civic  trust’  (Putnam 
1995:76). Discounting Tocqueville’s own historico-cultural sensibility and concern for 
the emotional substance of civil society, these works tend to reduce the relationship 
between civil society and democracy to a numbers game that is broadly replicable in 
any context. 
 
Of course, the very nature of democratic political culture is a source of contestation. 
There remains a good deal of debate surrounding the relative pros and cons of 
procedural versus substantive variants of democracy and there is considerable 
disagreement  over  the  point  at  which  a  country  might  be  considered  to  have 
consolidated its democracy. Definitions offered by so-called ‘minimalists’ suggest 
that democracy can be considered consolidated when formal legal institutions such 
as universal suffrage, freedom of speech and association exist in parallel with 
sequential unimpeded national elections. The problem with this approach however is 
that the presence of legal and formal institutions do not often provide any kind of 
guarantee against forms of corruption and exclusion stemming from entrenched 
socio-economic  inequalities  and  patterns  of  dominance  (Schatz  and  Gutierrez 
Rexach  2002).  Rather,  there  is  a  wide  range  of  attitudinal,  institutional  and 
procedural  requirements  that  must  be  met  for  democracy  to  be  considered 
consolidated (O’Donnell 1996; Schedler 1998). With this in mind, Encarnación (2003; 
2014) has developed a definition which attends to some of the weaknesses of more 
shallow models. For him, three things in particular are seen as suggesting a high 
level of overall quality of democracy: (1) civilian control of the military; (2) adherence 
to a broad menu of civil rights and political liberties; and (3) widespread acceptance 
of democracy by the citizenry as the best form of government: in other words, 
“democratic legitimacy.”’(Encarnación 2014:45). 
 
Using this definition, Encarnación (2003) finds that the empirical evidence on the 
democratizing power of a dense associational landscape at the national level is by 
no  means  conclusive.  A  close  reading  of  national  experiences  in  Europe,  for 
example, does not really support the liberal claim. When comparing Britain, France, 
the Netherlands and Belgium with those states that descended into communism, 
fascism, corporatism and other political ‘evils’ in the early twentieth century, ‘the 
particulars of the constitution of domestic civil society proved to be a poor indicator 
for predicting the development of democracy’ (Encarnación 2003:5). As he points 
out, countries like Germany and Italy had some of the densest civil societies in the 
late nineteenth century but found it challenging to build enduring democratic 
institutions as they moved into the next century. As Bemeo and Nord (2000:xvi) 
state, ‘not all civil societies, however dense and vibrant, give birth to democratic 
polities’. 
 
Furthermore, dense associational landscapes at the domestic level do not appear 
5  
consistently as precursors to the demise of authoritarian regimes. Huntington’s ‘third 
wave  of  democratization’  beginning  in  the  late  1970s  and  culminating  with  the 
spectacular  collapse of  the  Soviet  Union  in  1990,  conceals  a huge  diversity of 
domestic responses and varying degrees of civic pressure for change. ‘The spate of 
new democracies born out of this democratic revolution demonstrates that a stable 
 
democratic public life can in fact be attained when lacking most of the conditions 
usually  attached  to  a  vibrant  and  robust  civil  society’  (Encarnación  2003:16). 
Moreover, while it is true that some publics engaged in widespread protests that 
ushered in new political systems, in several Latin American countries, the support of 
transnational activist networks was perhaps as important to discrediting the regimes 
as existing forms of domestic association (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
 
These discrepancies highlight some decisive flaws in the neo-Tocquevillean formula. 
Firstly,  it  remains  largely  unclear  as  to  just  how  civic  association  facilitates 
democratic deepening. Some liberal optimists offer platitudes about civic virtues - 
tolerance, civility, nonviolence and disposition toward the public good - that are 
thought to be enhanced when all parts of the public can organize effectively to 
communicate their views outside of state-controlled channels. But crucially as James 
Holston (2008:13) argues, a self-organizing demos can cement a particular regime of 
citizenship as well as contest it: ‘…human agency also produces entrenchment, 
persistence and inertia’ which can of course stall progress towards better quality 
democracy. 
 
In some societies, non-state actors may be so dispersed or fragmented that 
governmental action or resources are needed to kick-start or add momentum to civil 
society organization. But many have quite rightly questioned whether the state can 
or should step in as a facilitator or benefactor of civil society, raising valid concerns 
that  such  relationships  jeopardize  the  autonomy  of  non-state  actors.  Foley  and 
Edwards (1996:38) also ask, ‘[i]f, as some hold, civil society's chief virtue is its ability 
to act as an organized counterweight to the state, to what extent can this happen 
without  the  help  of  political  parties  and  expressly  political  movements?’.  Thus, 
related to the question of how civic association leads to democratic deepening is the 
question of what civil society is: What kinds of actors does it include and exclude? 
Where do its boundaries lie? In the sense that civil society is frequently defined by 
what it is not - the government - all manner of alliances and institutions might be 
considered under its banner. In the broadest definitions, the media industries, the 
market and corporations can be said to belong to civil society, alongside criminal 
networks and gangs. But then we might well be inclined to ask why associational 
networks should be disposed toward inclusivity, civility and the public good at all. 
 
The point to be made is that there are of course no automatic links between the 
presence of dense organizational networks and the democratic credentials of a 
nation.   As  Waisman,   Feinburg   and   Zamosc   (2006:1)   suggest,   despite   the 
resurgence of interest in de Tocqueville’s work, the ‘specific processes that link civil 
society and politics have not been conceptualized with precision’. Social scientists 
should be prepared to investigate these processes; asking for example, whether 
dominant thought processes, ideas and connective practices within the self- 
organizing   sphere   are   attuned   to   and   indeed   compatible   with   democratic 
imperatives. If so, how and in what ways? In this sense, rather more important than 
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the mere presence of forms of civic association, are what Tocqueville himself 
originally described in terms of the ‘sentiments and ideas’ that renew themselves 
through reciprocal action of men [sic] upon each other. In other words, the emotional 
and ideational substance that animates civil society networks and informs their 
activities. 
 
Collective memory, civil society and democracy 
 
The  term  ‘collective  memory’  was  coined  by  the  French  sociologist  Maurice 
Halbwachs  in  his  publication,  La  Mémoire  Collective  (1950).  In  his  writing, 
Halbwachs explored the nature and constitution of individual memories, arguing that 
all individual memory was constructed within social structures and institutions such 
as the family, organization, and the nation-state. This insight has provided a point of 
departure for a range of interesting works exploring the foundational make-up of 
groups,  communities  and  nations.  As  Kansteiner  (2002:180)  states,  ‘[c]ollective 
memory  is  not  history,  though  it  is  sometimes  made  from  similar  material’. 
Communities of all sizes and types invoke stories, cultural artifacts, traditions and 
music  in  order  to  preserve  a  certain  continuity  and  connection  with  the  past. 
Crucially, these collectively valued objects and representations work to preserve and 
foment group unity or association. Collective memory may be thought of as the glue 
that binds civil society and its constitutive elements. Yet somewhat curiously, the 
phenomenon of collective memory is often absent in discussions about civil society 
and its democratising propensities. In the section that follows, I review some key 
interventions from the field of collective memory with the aim of illuminating just how 
collective   memory   animates   civil   society   and   influences   progress   towards 
democracy. 
 
 
Collective or cultural memory to some degree determines what kinds of political 
ideas and practices become dominant in civil society. According to Mohtashemi and 
Mui (2003) for example, collective memory is a strong source of connectivity and 
knowledge within networks of friends and social groupings. It provides a foundation 
upon which to draw when making decisions about how and when to act in an 
altruistic manner. Collective memory, then, helps determine the scope of who or 
what groups are ‘deserving’ of our charitable giving and other extensions of civic 
practice. Collective memory is heavily bound up with national and group identity. 
Habashi  (2013)  offers  one  strong  example  in  the  oral  story-telling  practices  of 
Palestinian children. She shows how such practices serve to underline feelings of 
community,  unity  and  continuity.  She  underlines  the  ways  in  which  children’s 
recollection of historical narratives alongside their own experiences as refugees in 
fact transforms the national narrative, enabling them to become co-authors of 
collective memory. Indeed, collective memory may be considered a crucial source of 
group identification and solidarity as individuals can appeal to shared experiences 
and understandings in order to negotiate and build a sense of history, place and 
belonging. Therefore, it frequently provides a benchmark and impetus for collective 
claim-making practices which act as a check on governmental power. Moreover, 
where civil society groups have experienced a democratic system in which their 
actions contribute to a broader architecture of accountability and representation, that 
experience may help sustain the stability of this political system. 
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Rallying against Agnes Heller’s suggestion that modern civil society lacks collective 
or cultural memory (Heller 2001), a number of scholars have forcefully argued that 
memory is gaining an ever stronger presence in art, literature and political discourse. 
Olick (1998) and Huyssen (2000; 2011) are amongst those who observe a significant 
shift away from the future-orientation of modernist and high modernist projects of the 
earlier  twentieth  century,  towards  a  contemporary  ‘memory  boom’  that  attaches 
value to shared processes of recollection. But what has caused this shift? Olick 
(1998) highlights that the growth of scholarly and societal interest in memory has in 
part followed on from global political developments, including the increase in redress 
and reparation claims which can be traced back to the universal impact of the 
Holocaust  and  the  Nuremburg  trials.  Huyssen  (2000)  however,  offers  some 
alternative ideas, arguing that the move from ‘present futures’ to ‘present pasts’ is 
driven   by   processes   of   globalisation   and   has   both   an   historical   and   a 
phenomenological dimension. On the one hand, recovering distinct memories can be 
seen as a step in the process of decolonisation as it opens up history for previously 
marginalised groups, making them owners and producers of social knowledge. This 
seems like an inherently democratic process. On the other hand, the turn towards 
memory can be seen as a reaction to globalisation in which cultures, communities 
and nations grapple for some kind of anchoring in a world transformed by dizzying 
transnational flows and densities of information. This is where things begin to get 
complicated for democracy. 
 
As Misztal (2010) suggests, globalisation pulls us in opposite directions and raises 
the question of what we ought to remember in the new global age. The issue is that 
globalisation processes entice us to forget the local and national identities that have 
stabilised the Westphalian system so as to make way for the emergence of new 
global connections. In the wake of this decoupling of nation and identity in the some 
social forces have pushed ever harder to reclaim and protect national symbols, 
customs and languages. For example, scholars Hamber and Wilson (2002) highlight 
the preponderance of nationalist discourse in the recent literature on truth 
commissions. Following Michael Ignatieff, they claim that although truth commissions 
may provide a useful platform for civil society groups to initiate an ongoing dialogue 
about the past, the processes themselves are often cloaked in claims about ‘healing 
the nation’ by fomenting a common, singular and shared memory of a troubled past. 
The extent to which supplanting one dominant memory with another can improve the 
stability of the political system is questionable. This is not in the least because the 
memory can ‘cut both ways’, promoting closure and healing in society or creating 
new  chasms,  cleavages  and  animosities  by  advancing  the  experiences  of  a 
particular group. 
 
It is perhaps no wonder then that some political philosophers have promoted 
collective forgetting as a pre-condition for a new polity. The works of Rawls and 
Hobbes provide precedents for a kind of “democratic forgetting” that allowed society 
to start afresh without inherited resentments. Some of these arguments are borne 
out in Encarnación’s Democracy without Justice in Spain. In this study, the author 
offers  a  detailed  overview  of  Spanish  history  since  the  civil  war.  Encarnación 
(2014:187) stresses the uniqueness of Spain as a country that has encouraged a 
politics of forgetting in order to create and solidify its democratic institutions. He 
argues that the Spanish example offers strong evidence to the power of forgetting 
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and underlines that, ‘coming to terms with the past is not as static or formulaic a 
process as the transitional justice movement would suggest’. As Misztal (2005:1326) 
summarises, sometimes forgetting is a necessity. This is because, 
 
 
[p]reoccupation with memory of the past injustices could easily 
lead to social conflicts because it enhances ‘the collective 
narcissism of minor differences’ that forms ‘the basis of feelings 
of  strangers  and  hostility’  between  people…Groups  that  turn 
toward their past to glorify specific aspects of it and demand a 
recognition  of  suffering  risk  allowing  collective  memory  to  be 
used as a political instrument that legitimises myths and 
nationalist propaganda. Such fascination with memory might 
become an obstacle to democracy because groups compete for 
recognition of suffering, undermining the democratic spirit of 
cooperation. 
 
The dynamism of history and the incongruity between past and present social 
conditions are what allow collective memory to evolve, but the ever-present gap 
between what was and what is remembered makes collective memory susceptible to 
instrumentalism. Hence, Paul Ricouer (2004) suggests that memory might be thrice 
used and abused: it may be stymied, forced or manipulated for ideological purposes. 
He argues that in the latter is the most disquieting of abuses. This is because 
ideology and interest remains masked with the invocation of collective memory: 
 
Memory  can  be  ideologized  through  the  resources  of  the 
variations offered by the work of narrative configuration… the 
means of  a  clever strategy,  consisting from  the outset  in  a 
strategy  of  forgetting  as  much  as  in  a  strategy  of 
remembering… At this level of appearance, imposed memory is 
armed with a history that is itself ‘authorised’, the official history, 
the publicly learned and celebrated. (Ricoeur 2004:85) 
 
He also warns, that all cues for remembering should be probed to reveal their 
omissions: in prompting us to remember something particular, what do they 
simultaneously encourage us to forget? Such cues should also be critically evaluated 
in light of whose interests they promote and whether they do indeed foster the 
realisation of democratic expression and civic will. 
 
Taken together, these debates suggest that collective memory can be a source of 
strength and integration for civil society but there is no guarantee that the invocation 
of collective memory will enhance the civic virtues anticipated by liberal theorists. 
Appeals to collective memory may well be important for building unity, solidarity, 
sense of place and purpose but we should also be sensitive to the violence done by 
projects  that  seek  to  homogenise  distinct  recollections,  especially  when  such 
projects harbour interests that run counter to the goals of freedom and equality. It is 
crucial to note that collective memory is itself the site of strategic action, where 
interests may be pursued in contradistinction to democratic outcomes. The sections 
that follow endeavour to demonstrate the relevance of some of these insights in the 
Brazilian case. 
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Brazil: from ditadura to distensão 
 
 
During the period of military rule in Brazil, social struggles were heavily repressed, 
thousands of alleged dissidents were imprisoned or harassed by police, many were 
exiled and a number estimated in the hundreds were illegally executed. Yet, Brazil 
has been far slower to address its military past than neighbouring states, leading 
some scholars to describe the country as a ‘regional outlier’ (Atencio 2014) and 
others to identify a pervasive ‘culture of amnesia’ (Schneider 2011) that has affected 
the nation. Collective remembering is only possible to the extent that events and 
processes from the past are revisited and publicly validated through representative 
and communicative practices within society. Indeed, ‘our impressions yield to the 
forms that social life imposes on them’ (Halbwachs 1992:49). This section reviews 
existing scholarship and identifies a range of pressures to close down on the 
collective memory of violence and atrocities committed during Brazil’s authoritarian 
period,  including:  the  regime’s  ability  to  tap  into  national  pride  by  usurping  the 
memory of Brazil’s ‘unfulfilled promise’, a strong degree of complicity from the 
mainstream media, and a  strategic  continuismo  that characterised the country’s 
process of transition. 
 
 
2014 marked the 50th anniversary of the coup which ousted the democratically 
elected president João Goulart in 1964. On the 22nd  of March of that year, over a 
million  Brazilian  citizens  participated  in  the  ‘March  of  the  Family  with  God’  a 
demonstration  against  Goulart’s  proposed  social  reforms  and  the  supposed 
communist threat to the nation. Not all of the marchers had favored a coup. Yet, the 
demonstration lent a semblance of popular support to the operation that followed 
shortly thereafter, installing a military regime that would last for 21 years, the longest 
in modern Latin American history. Upon seizing power, the self-styled ‘Supreme 
Command of the Revolution’ set about instituting a series of  Atos Institucionais 
(Institutional Acts or AIs) reducing the civil service, suspending political rights and 
 
establishing  a  bogus  two-party  system  that  prevented  the  direct  election  of 
presidents and governors – a measure designed to offer a thin veneer of democratic 
legitimacy. 
 
Although each of the six military administrations were implicated in the abuse of 
power   through   institutionalised   torture   and   arbitrary   arrest,   General   Emílio 
Garrastazu Medici presided over the most violent period of rule between 1969 and 
1974. Dubbed the ‘era dos desaparacidos’ (era of the disappeared) at least 170 
alleged opponents are said to have been killed during Medici’s time in office, and 
many more were tortured in army and police cells. Whilst sanctioning extreme levels 
of violence to reign in alleged militants, Medici doubled as an economic virtuoso, 
overseeing a booming economy that achieved growth rates of over 10% a year. 
Moreover, the construction of the Trans-Amazonian Highway and the world's largest 
hydroelectric dam in the Rio Paraná, at Itaipu were lauded by the Medici 
administration as opportunities to lift the hinterland out of poverty and consolidate 
mastery over the intractable rainforest. Although several campaign groups tried to 
raise the profile of indigenous groups that were displaced or killed to make way for 
these large-scale ‘modernizing’ projects (McDonald 1993), the economic successes 
of the military republic pacified many sectors of Brazilian society and tapped into 
dormant  hopes  that  Brazil  would  finally  emerge  as  the  'country  of  the  future' 
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envisioned by Stephan Zweig in 1941. Eakin (1998) and others elaborate on the idea 
of an ‘unfulfilled promise’ that has long-permeated the Brazilian collective psyche 
and political discourse: in spite of the country’s massive size, huge population, rich 
culture and incredible array of natural resources it has remained a ‘sleeping giant’ 
unable to mobilize its strengths to emerge as a world power. 
 
 
Finding another clever way to tap into this aspect of national discomfiture, the Medici 
government successfully cloaked itself in the glory of the Brazil’s 1970 World Cup 
victory. Medici declared a national holiday to acknowledge celebrations taking place 
on the streets. His office distributed posters that featured the footballer Pele scoring 
a goal and the slogan, ‘Ninguem segura mais este pais’ (Nobody can stop this 
country now). Others read ‘Pra Frente Brasil’ (Forward Brazil). Skidmore (1988) 
describes this as a ‘bread and circuses strategy’  designed to distract  the  povo 
(people or masses) from international criticisms of repression and turn Medici into a 
national hero. 
 
Rothstein (2000) underlines the strong influence of ‘information entrepreneurs’, such 
as media gatekeepers and politicians over what becomes regarded as ‘truth’ in 
society. From the time of the coup until Brazil’s period of opening up, known as the 
distensão   (decompression),   the   military  establishment’s   pronouncements  and 
rhetoric were given credence, amplification and support by many of Brazil’s largest 
news providers. Straubhaar’s entry for the Encyclopedia of Television claims that the 
military governments saw televisual communication as a key tool for boosting 
nationalism, creating a broader consumer economy and controlling information. He 
continues: ‘The military pushed television deeper into the population by subsidizing 
[sic] credit for set sales [and] by building national microwave and satellite distribution 
systems’. Globo, Rede Record, O Estado de Sao Paulo, Folha de Sao Paulo, Jornal 
do Brasil and Correio da Manha have all at some point been implicated in providing 
a platform for the regime (Coelho 2013). TV Globo was founded the same year as 
the military coup and it became a privileged partner for the regime. Atencio (2014) 
describes some of the rewards Globo received for their loyalty including being 
permitted to pursue a joint venture with the Time-Life Corporation which cemented 
the company’s leading market position and brought it enormous financial rewards. 
 
Beginning in 1974 and culminating with direct presidential elections in 1985, Brazil’s 
democratic transition was extremely protracted. Over this period, new political 
freedoms and higher levels of tolerance towards protesters were seen to emerge 
incrementally. In the early 1980s, as the country began to open up, there was 
considerable coverage of the regime’s abuses of power in the mainstream Brazilian 
print media. The magazine Veja, for example, published several high-profile articles, 
including an exclusive interview with Amilcar Lobo, a doctor who assisted in torture 
sessions. With  the  Geisel  administration  easing  up  on  press  censorship,  major 
newspapers and magazines catered to the public’s thirst for information about the 
dictatorship’s secret human rights crimes through coverage of the waves of returning 
exiles, hunger strikes waged by the few remaining political prisoners. Yet, there was 
little to no parallel coverage on television, which was at the time dominated by the 
Globo network. In 1984, TV Globo initially supported the military government against 
the nationwide campaign for direct elections known as the Diretas-Ja movement. All 
in all, inconsistent - and sometimes really quite favorable - coverage of the regime’s 
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activities helped to entrench the idea that the dictatorship was comparably ‘soft’ on 
its opponents. 
 
The Brazilian distensão also featured a range of carefully calculated gestures which 
variously called upon and regulated the collective memory of the nation. Important 
among these was Law 6,683, popularly known as the Amnesty Law. This law had 
come into force following a widespread campaign by the Brazilian Amnesty 
Committee (CBA, acronym in Portuguese), Women's Movement for Amnesty (MFPA, 
acronym in Portuguese), the student movement, as well as other pro-amnesty units 
inside and outside the country that called for the pardoning of activists, exiles and 
political prisoners. Although the campaign succeeded in getting a bill passed, the 
final version of the law, which came into force in 1979, covered not only the regime’s 
various opponents but also state torturers. As a result it provided lasting impunity for 
a great many of Brazil’s military and security officers. ‘In the case of the dead and 
the disappeared, the law instituted a certificate of unknown whereabouts with 
presumed death which exempted the State from investigating the circumstances of 
the crimes or even the whereabouts of the bodies’ (Teles 2006). Exploring a range of 
activist  testimonies  from  the  time,  Atencio  (2014)  finds  that  a  strong  number 
favoured  a  strategy of  conciliation  with  the  regime.  As a  result,  the  ‘reciprocal’ 
Amnesty Law was broadly accepted despite quite minimal concessions from the 
government. Schneider adds that dominant civil society groups rejected a more 
confrontational approach in favour of a general amnesty that would ‘reconcile the 
Brazilian family’ (Schneider 2010; 2011). 
 
In a fascinating study, Rodeghero (2014) unpicks the metaphor of familial 
reconciliation in Brazil which she finds ubiquitous in interviews, correspondence, 
newspaper cuttings, pamphlets and manifestos from both 1945 - the end of the 
Estado  Novo  period  - and  1979.  Rodeghero  (2014)  finds  clear  parallels  in  the 
language used in 1945, when Getulio Vargas permitted the reintegration of political 
opponents, and the movement for political amnesty which mobilized between 1975- 
79. She expands: 
 
The much talked about pacification or reconciliation of the 
Brazilian family, [is a] characteristic element of our political 
tradition, close to conciliation. Conciliation is part of a recurring 
trend in Brazilian political history of arrangements between the 
political  elite  whereby,  according  to  José  Honório  Rodrigues, 
they have learned that it is the best strategy to avert popular 
participation and the claims of the "people" in situations of risk 
(Rodrigues, 1982). According to Renato Lemos, the tradition of 
amnesty during Brazilian history reflects "wider traditions: 
conciliation as a form of protecting the fundamental interests of 
the  dominant  classes  in  our  society  and  that  of  preventive 
counter-revolution as an anti-crisis strategy"… (Rodeghero 
2014). 
 
Effectively, Rodeghero identifies the strategy of conciliation as long-entrenched in 
the collective memory of the nation; a tradition or practice - hinged on forgetting - 
that has been recurrently called forth to deal with the political conflicts of the day. 
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Built into the Brazilian tradition of conciliation, is a pattern of advantage that 
consistently favours the interests of elites. Teles (2006) and others have lamented 
that, as Brazil opened up, ‘The crimes of the dictatorship were simply no matter for 
discussion, not even so that they could be objectively forgiven’. In Rodeghero’s work 
we get a glimpse of how collective memory can in fact limit the ambitions of popular 
movements and regulate ways of ‘doing politics’. This has a certain resonance with 
Paul  Amar’s  recent  work  on  ‘parastatal  formations’,  which  illuminates  how  civil 
society actors sometimes unwittingly come to perform the public functions of the 
state (Amar 2011). 
 
A wide range of authors including Mainwaring (1986); Linz and Stepan (1996) and 
Zaverucha (1994), Arturi (2001); Gugliano and Gallo (2013) have commented on the 
continuismo  (continuities)  that  characterised  the  Brazilian  democratic  transition. 
Mainwaring (1986) for example explains the outgoing regime’s endeavours to split 
the emergent opposition into discordant factions. Meanwhile, Goes (2013) highlights 
that during the Constituent Assembly of 1988, most of the clauses that could have 
curtailed military impunity were skilfully and strategically omitted. Within the new 
civilian administration, military officials remained in positions of influence. Even the 
first civilian President, Jose Sarney, had long-standing connections to the outgoing 
regime, having previously led the government party ARENA. 
 
As Atencio (2014:13) points out, ‘Brazil’s first civilian President in more than twenty 
years took no meaningful steps toward reckoning with such crimes during his 
administration;  to  the  contrary,  he  made  a  practice  of  pointedly  ignoring  the 
question…’. In the years following the formal transition, sequential ‘…democratic 
governments chose to  confront the authoritarian past through avoidance’  (Goes 
2013:90), upholding an amnesty law designed to foreclose on calls for truth, justice 
and remembrance and repeatedly conceding to the demands and interests of the 
military establishment. Referring to the 1985 publication of Brasil: Nunca Mais, a 
book documenting 17,000 victims, and 1,800 torture episodes between 1964 and 
1979, Patrick Wilcken (2012:70) states: 
 
In any other context, a book like Brasil: Nunca Mais would have 
created ripple effects, as cases, names and methods were laid 
bare—not as loose, possibly politicized allegations, but in the 
black-and-white of court papers. But in post-dictatorship Brazil, 
not one of the 444 named torturers suffered any sanction, other 
than occasional harassment by campaign groups like Amnesty 
International. A large number continued working in police 
interrogation  centres  across  the  country,  some  indeed 
becoming the subject of more recent allegations of torture; most 
have ended up retiring on generous state pensions. 
 
The Brazilian experience from 1964 offers evidence to Ricouer’s claims about the 
instrumentalization and abuse of memory. Here, the military, mainstream media and 
even the first civilian governments armed themselves with an ‘authorized’ history that 
undersold the violence of the ditadura and spoke to the interests of the armed forces. 
Although there were some signs of progress, such as the creation of the Comissão 
da Anistia (Amnesty Commission) in 2001 to receive and investigate claims against 
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the military, as recently as February 2004, military pressure forced the government 
to obstruct a judgment ordering the opening of military files. Shortly thereafter, the 
government claimed that all records had been destroyed by the military in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
 
Brazil: from distensão to fragmentação 
 
 
When compared to prior civilian governments, which have variously shirked, dodged 
and closed down on attempts to usurp the violent past, the sequential PT 
administrations since 2005 have been quite proactive. Under the leadership of Luiz 
Inácio Lula da Silva, compensation for the families of the disappeared was extended. 
Da Silva also appointed Paulo Vannuchi, a former activist and dissident under the 
regime, to the position of Human Rights Minister; a move that caused discomfort 
within  the  military.  In  2006  and  2009,  Vannuchi  led  the  Direito  à  verdade  e  à 
memória (Right of Memory and Truth) and the Memórias Reveladas (Revealed 
Memories) projects, which inaugurated exhibitions and monuments to those 
assassinated by the regime. In 2007, the Amnesty Commission extended its work, 
collaborating with trade unions, universities and faith groups across the country to 
initiate caravanas: local hearings that allow victims of repression the possibility of 
public  acknowledgement,  apology  and  reparation  for  the   crimes  of   Brazil’s 
dictatorship.  Under  Lula’s  leadership,  the  possibility  of  establishing  a  Truth 
Commission  was  publicly  debated  for  the  first  time  (Goes  2013).  Later,  Dilma 
Rousseff’s presidency presented an opportune moment for the creation of a Truth 
Commission, with a president who was herself a victim of human rights violations 
under the military regime (Engstrom 2012). The former guerilla fighter, who was 
jailed and tortured under the military regime, first opened military records in 2011 
and  then  inaugurated  Brazil’s  Comissão  Nacional  da  Verdade  (National  Truth 
Commission or CNV) on May 10, 2013. High profile PT officials have claimed that 
the  CNV  is a  mark of  Brazil’s  modern  democratic  character,  signaling  that  the 
country is ‘now stable enough to seek the truth, following a long soul-searching 
process’ (Ogier 2012). Brazil’s former Defense Minister Celso Amorim, for example, 
has variously described the inauguration of the CNV and other truth projects as an 
‘epilogue to the democratic transition’ (ibid.), arguing that the PT’s turn to memory 
has strengthened democracy (Amorim 2011). 
 
So, why the shift in emphasis? On the one hand, many observers have linked the 
PT’s endeavors to resurrect and shift the parameters of collective memory to the 
personal experiences and interests of Da Silva, Rousseff and Vannuchi. 
 
The origins of the new ‘politics of memory’ in Brazil are partially 
rooted in the agents advancing this agenda. As union leader, 
Lula himself played a key role in opposing the military regime 
and in the process of democratization (Alves, 1985: 203, 209). 
Various members of Lula’s government were guerrilla fighters 
or student leaders who opposed the regime. According to Maria 
Celina D’Arau 囲jo (2010), 49 per cent of the ministers in  
Lula’s 
two governments have ‘political experience in the underground’ 
such as clandestine opposition to the dictatorship. Vannuchi 
and Presidential Chief of Staff Dilma Rousseff both experienced 
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prison and torture (Schneider 2010:10) 
 
This explanation has been forcefully seized upon by the PT’s critics, who have 
accused the trio of enacting a vindictive policy programme against the right wing and 
military.  A more compelling  argument  however,  is  that efforts  to  re-inscribe the 
collective memory stem from the PT’s now well-established practice of pragmatic 
government (Bremmer and Garman 2010), which in this instance seeks to balance 
an entrenched domestic reticence against an ‘international logic of appropriateness’. 
 
Checkel (1998; 1999) and others argue that state action is driven by rules of 
appropriate or exemplary behaviour. The pursuit of individual or national interest is 
often mediated by a need to ‘ fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, 
a  membership  in  a  political  community  or  group,  and  the  ethos,  practices  and 
expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, [state actors] do 
what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation’ (March 
and  Olsen  2004:3).  More  to  the  point,  since  Brazil’s  return  to  civilian  rule, 
 
international observers have become increasingly attentive to the contradictions of 
the country’s legacy of impunity. Amnesty International, the Inter American Court of 
Human Rights - Latin America’s regional human rights mechanism - and the former 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay are amongst those 
that have led calls for truth, justice and an end to impunity. In 2009 for example, 
Pillay claimed that the absence of debate around torture merely reaffirmed a legacy 
of legitimacy for authoritarianism. 
 
Brazil is the only country in South America not to have taken 
action to confront abuses committed during the period of military 
rule. While I recognize that this is a politically sensitive subject, 
there are ways of dealing with it which avoid reopening the 
wounds   of   the   past   and   help   to   heal   them   instead. 
Torture, however, is an exception. International law is 
unequivocal: torture is a crime against humanity and cannot be 
left unpunished. The fact that the torture that took place in the 
military era has still not been dealt with by Brazil means that the 
proper,  clear  disincentives  to  commit  torture  now  and  in  the 
future are not in place (Pillay 2009). 
 
 
The political costs of ignoring calls to confront the past are high for a state keen 
emerge as a global power and shed the ‘sleeping giant’ trope. And yet, due to the 
very particular characteristics of the dictadura and distensão explored in the 
preceding section, domestic civil society support for truth and justice initiatives has 
not always matched up to international demands. Although some organizations such 
as Tortura Nunca Mais, the Ordem Avocados Brasileiros (Brazilian Bar Association 
or OAB), the Frente de Esculacho Popular and Levante Popular da Juventude have 
worked tirelessly to raise the profile of victims and challenge the entrenched culture 
of  silence  and  ‘unremembering’  in  Brazil,  they  have  faced  persistent  denial  or 
justification by a military institution that has retained high levels of popular support. 
Opinion polls from 2009, for example, suggested that up to 45% of the populace 
were opposed to the punishment of former police and military personnel found guilty 
of torture (DataFolha cited by Schneider 2011). 
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One of the most important achievements of the PT’s truth initiatives has been the 
opening up of political space in Brazil. Through initiatives such as the caravanas, art 
exhibitions and most recently the CNV, the state has provided new spaces for 
discussion, debate and listening that allow previously marginalized actors and 
memories be amplified and legitimized. The testimony of retired army colonel Paulo 
Malhães to the CNV in 2014, for instance, confirmed that torture was institutionalized 
within the military state. Meirelles (2014) adds: ‘For the first time a former army 
officer admitted the existence of centers of torture and that he worked at one of them 
–  the so-called “House [of] Death” (Casa da Morte)’. Moreover, as memories of 
torture have been revealed, they have prompted a re-examination of the present. In 
particular, the persistence of high levels of violence and impunity throughout Brazil’s 
criminal justice system have increasingly been called to attention by scholars, social 
movements, campaign groups and the media. As Wilcken (2012) summarizes, today 
“[t]here  is a  strong  argument  that  the  persistence  of  torture  throughout  Brazil’s 
criminal   justice   system   is   a   hangover   from   dictatorship-era   structures   and 
techniques. All that has changed are the targets: in place of the university-educated 
left-wing activists, who have long since rejoined the elite, are the  marginais, or 
delinquents—overwhelmingly young, poor, black men picked up in favelas on petty 
drug charges”. 
 
Cognitive dissonance is the term psychologists use to describe the feeling of 
uncomfortable tension which comes from holding two conflicting thoughts in the mind 
at the same time (Evans 2015). The seeming contradiction of a governing party 
promoting an agenda of truth about past violences, whilst failing to deal 
comprehensively with ongoing police brutality was one of several issues brought into 
sharp relief in June 2013, when a few thousand demonstrators in Sao Paulo, led by 
the Movimento Passe Livre (Free Pass Movement) mounted an opposition to an 
impending rise in the cost of public transport. The police clamped down hard on the 
protestors, using a combination of teargas, pepper-spray, and rubber bullets to quell 
them. Yet, this only led to an escalation of contention. Upon witnessing the violence 
via their television sets and computers, ‘up to a million people across 100 cities’ 
assembled on the streets (BBC 2013). They protested against the combination of 
 
poor public services, police violence and corruption all linked to planned sports 
mega-events – the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. 
 
Whilst Brazil has seen many new social movements emerge in the last decade, 
many have been pre-occupied with identarian politics and have followed the 
horizontal mobilization patterns, anti-institutionalist and transnationalist tone of the 
earlier alter-globalization movement (Abers 2013). Whilst these elements were also 
present during the 2013 protests, anti-dictatorship slogans achieved a special 
prominence, with graffiti on the state security department building drawing explicit 
links   to   the   dictatorship.   Mollona   (2014)   posits   that,   ‘Perhaps   in   normal 
circumstances, the violence of the police might have passed unnoticed. But these 
heavy repressive measures coincided with the public debates on the military regime 
and on Brazil’s unfinished transition to democracy generated by the work of the 
National Commission of Truth (CNV)’. 
 
However, contention around the PT’s memory initiatives - particularly the CNV - also 
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reminds us that attempts to shift the terrain of collective memory can catalyze conflict 
and even unsettle the political system. In 2009, after Lula da Silva announced plans 
to set up a truth commission that would investigate crimes committed during the 
military dictatorships, the Defense Minister, Nelson Jobim, and three leading military 
officials tendered their resignations. In the midst of this debate, popular magazines 
including Veja came out in defense of the military, describing the Human Rights 
Minister as a ‘madman’, and even ‘a terrorist...with a pen’ (Schneider 2011). ‘Even 
as the first stirrings of dissent within the government were being aired, the Minister of 
Defence  Nelson  Jobim,  the  Supreme  Court  judge  Gilmar  Mendes  and,  most 
crucially, the Attorney General’s office went on the counter-attack, vigorously 
defending the broadest possible interpretation of the Amnesty Law’ (Wilcken 2012). 
Since then, resistance from the military and its right-wing support base in Brazil have 
not abated. Pressures from the military worked to curb the mandate of the proposed 
CNV, meaning that its early tone was conciliatory. A 2010 Supreme Court decision 
reaffirming the Amnesty Law also insulated former torturers against legal 
proceedings. Nonetheless, even as the CNV was underway in 2014, excavating 
histories   of   violence   perpetrated   against   fellow   citizens,   over   a   thousand 
demonstrators marched in cities across Brazil in a restaging of the 1964 ‘March of 
the Family with God’, the action that ushered in the period of military rule. 
 
This event was one among many organized in 2014 and 2015 by an increasingly 
vocal pro-dictatorship movement in Brazil. Tempered by allegations of corruption 
within the high ranks of the PT, plummeting public approval ratings for the governing 
party, high rates of unemployment, inflation and concerns over migrant flows, this 
movement has gained increasing momentum. Gatehouse (2014) observes a number 
of commemorative events that have been initiated or appropriated by the pro-military 
movement intent on celebrating the ‘achievements’ of the dictatorship years. These 
include a mass held in Brasília as well as an event held in Congress where the ex- 
soldier,    now    Congressman,    Jair    Bolsonaro    released    a    banner    reading 
‘Congratulations to the military 31st / March / 1964: Thanks to you Brazil is not 
Cuba.’  Gatehouse  (2014)  warns  that  it  is  not  just  the  military  who  have  been 
engaged in the defense of a collective memory broadly favorable  to the regime. In 
February 2014, Itaú, Brazil’s largest private bank, issued a calendar/planner in which 
the  31st  of  March  was  labeled  ‘as  ‘the  anniversary  of  the  1964  revolution’  – 
‘revolution’  being  the  preferred  term  of  members  of  the  military  and  those 
sympathetic to the dictatorship’. One month later, a Law professor at the University 
of São Paulo lectured that, ‘the coup occurred at a time when “leftist totalitarian 
socialism was seeking to take total control of Brazil”’  (Gatehouse 2014). Following 
Rousseff’s narrow re-election in October 2014, about a thousand people mounted a 
demonstration on the main thoroughfare of the Avenida Paulista, Sao Paulo, calling 
for a military coup (SP247 2014). 
 
Based on 1,000 witness statements and 80 public hearings, the CNV released its 
final report in December 2014. It lists 377 ‘autores’ (perpetrators) of human rights 
abuses, recommending that the Brazilian judiciary work to establish legal 
responsibility and not apply the 1979 Amnesty Law in relation to cases of torture. 
The report also called for institutional and legal reform of the Armed Forces and for 
them   to   take   full   institutional   responsibility   for   atrocities   committed.   These 
recommendations have further ignited hostilities between the PT and the military’s 
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support base. In 2015, conservative figures with backgrounds in the police or armed 
forces such as Moroni Torgan, Waldir Soares, Éder Mauro, Jair Bolsonaro and his 
son Eduardo used increasingly belligerent language against President Rousseff. 
Meanwhile, marches and demonstrations on the streets of São Paulo drew up to 
200,000 participants and called for: ‘Fora Dilma’ [Dilma out]; ‘Fora PT’ [PT out]. 
Amongst the crowds there some strong reactions encapsulated in banners reading: 
‘o povo e soberano, intervenção militar não e crime’ [the people are sovereign, 
military  intervention  is  not  a  crime];  and,  referring  to  the  PT  administration 
specifically, ‘porque não mataram todos em 1964?’ [why weren’t they all killed in 
1964?]. 
 
At the other end of the scale are expressions of discontent over concessions that the 
PT has made to the military. The Levante Popular da Juventude (Popular Youth 
Uprising) are amongst those CSO’s that have benefitted from the opening up of 
political space under the PT. The movement emerged around 2011, and became 
active campaigners for the formation of the Truth Commission. Yet, in the years since 
the inauguration of the CNV, the Levante Popular da Juventude have altered their 
tone and ambitions, calling ever more loudly for the revocation of the Amnesty Law 
and the trial of former officers. As Hamber and Wilson (2002:53) explain, truth 
commissions may well facilitate a common and shared memory, but a challenge is 
that individual and collective-institutional timelines and requirements for closure quite 
often diverge. We might find that: ‘Truth commissions do not heal the nation, restore 
the collective psyche or categorically deal with the past […] They may […] cause 
further psychological trauma when individuals …are expected to advance at the 
same pace as the state institutions which are created in their name, but which are 
primarily pursuing a national political agenda’. 
 
 
Prevalent among the actions of the Levante Popular da Juventude is a practice 
known as ‘esculacho’.   Esculachos are ‘something between a march, an action or 
happening,   and   a   public   shaming’   (Whitener   2009:21).   Through   localized 
demonstrations and performances, they identify torturers and officials of the 1964- 
 
1985 military regime. In May 2011 for example,  the group targeted the alleged 
torturer of Dilma Rousseff, spraying ‘Dilma’s torturer lives here’ in red paint on the 
pavement  outside  the  home  of  former  military  official  Maurício  Lopes  Lima. 
Esculacho or escrache (in Spanish) originated over two decades ago in Argentina 
when the campaign group HIJOS mobilized to denounce impunity for torturers and 
officials  of  that  country’s  dictatorship.  Escraches  emerged  at  a  juncture  when 
criminal proceedings had stalled. They are widely are considered a form of ‘Do It 
Yourself’ justice, but in Argentina at least, they have divided public and scholarly 
opinion. Whilst some have acknowledged the role of the Argentine escraches as a 
kind of catalyst ushering progress toward criminal trials for torturers, others have 
been rather more wary of the ways that these direct actions allow protestors to take 
matters into their own hands without fair trial or due process. Some have likened the 
Argentine escrache to a form of mob justice and vigilantism that has the potential to 
engender and escalate cycles of violence and retribution. As Russell (2014) 
highlights, although it is tempting to use existing Argentine ideas to inform the study 
of esculachos in Brazil, it would be wrong to simply transfer theoretical insights 
across from one case to the next. Although the contentious performances in Brazil 
are undoubtedly informed by the Argentine example, it is important to note that they 
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have emerged and evolved in a unique social and historical context. It remains to be 
seen exactly how the Brazilian esculacho, as a relatively recent manifestation, will 
interact with existing and evolving democratic and legal processes. 
 
 
 
Reflections 
 
This article had two closely related aims: i) to redirect analytical focus toward the 
relationship between collective memory in the ‘self organizing sphere’ and political 
outcomes; and, ii) to use insights gleaned from the marriage of civil society and 
social memory studies literatures as a guide to understanding the Brazilian 
experience. With these aims in mind, the first two parts of this paper sought to revisit 
and connect scholarly works from the traditions of civil society and social memory 
studies in order to explore the somewhat ambiguous relationship between collective 
memory, civil society and democracy. This theoretical excavation suggested that 
when actors in civil society are pressed or prompted to ‘remember’, progress toward 
democracy  can  be  variously  strengthened,  disrupted  or  stalled.  Crucially,  what 
becomes collective memory, who promotes it, and when they do so, can all alter the 
prospects for democratic deepening. On the one hand, this tell us that numbers are 
not enough - ensuring a large or dense civil society does not guarantee progress 
toward democracy. On the other hand, it also provides grounds for questioning the 
PT’s claim that Brazil’s recent ‘turn to memory’ is a suitable epilogue to the transition 
that will help to consolidate democracy in the country. 
 
The second half of this paper centred on the case of Brazil. Explorations into Brazil’s 
process of ‘forgetting’ and it’s recent steps towards ‘remembering’ reveal collective 
memory as a site of on-going strategic action, where interests have been pursued, 
often in contradistinction to clearly defined democratic outcomes. A close reading of 
the Brazilian example suggests that in taking up calls to recover the past, the 
governing PT party has opened up democratic space and brought entrenched 
structures of violence to the forefront of public consciousness. However, there is also 
evidence that the ‘turn to memory’ has accelerated processes of political fracture or 
fragmentation in Brazil,  with  CSO’s from across the political spectrum  vying for 
different objectives and outcomes related to the CNV. Within this, the emergence of 
an increasingly vocal pro-dictatorship movement suggests that it may still be too 
early to claim an out and out victory for democracy in Brazil. To borrow from Linz and 
Stepan (1996): democracy is not yet ‘the only game in town’. The recent growth of 
this  movement  suggests  that  establishing  “democratic  legitimacy”  (Encarnación 
2003) is an ongoing challenge for the PT’s leadership and it remains unclear just 
how much - if at all - the CNV and related memory initiatives can boost public 
confidence in democracy. The record thus far is mixed at best and indicates that the 
shift  from  an  ‘absent’  to  a  ‘present’  past  in  Brazil  holds  altogether  uncertain 
prospects for further democratic deepening. 
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